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Abstract
We present CHORUS, a system with a novel architec-
ture for providing differential privacy for statistical SQL
queries. The key to our approach is to embed a differ-
ential privacy mechanism into the query before execu-
tion so the query automatically enforces differential pri-
vacy on its output. CHORUS is compatible with any SQL
database that supports standard math functions, requires
no user modifications to the database or queries, and si-
multaneously supports many differential privacy mecha-
nisms. To the best of our knowledge, no existing system
provides these capabilities.
We demonstrate our approach using four general-
purpose differential privacy mechanisms. In the first
evaluation of its kind, we use CHORUS to evaluate these
four mechanisms on real-world queries and data. The re-
sults demonstrate that our approach supports 93.9% of
statistical queries in our corpus, integrates with a pro-
duction DBMS without any modifications, and scales to
hundreds of millions of records.
CHORUS is currently being deployed at Uber for its
internal analytics tasks. CHORUS represents a signif-
icant part of the company’s GDPR compliance efforts,
and can provide both differential privacy and access con-
trol enforcement. In this capacity, CHORUS processes
more than 10,000 queries per day.
1 Introduction
Organizations are collecting more and more sensitive in-
formation about individuals. As this data is highly valu-
able for a broad range of business interests, organizations
are motivated to provide analysts with flexible access to
the data. At the same time, the public is increasingly con-
cerned about privacy protection. There is a growing and
urgent need for technology solutions that balance these
∗Work done while at the University of California, Berkeley
interests by supporting general-purpose analytics while
guaranteeing privacy protection.
Differential privacy [16, 22] is widely recognized by
experts as the most rigorous theoretical solution to this
problem. Differential privacy provides a formal guar-
antee of privacy for individuals while allowing general
statistical analysis of the data. In short, it states that
the presence or absence of any single individual’s data
should not have a large effect on the results of a query.
This allows precise answers to questions about popula-
tions in the data while guaranteeing the results reveal lit-
tle about any individual. Unlike alternative approaches
such as anonymization and k-anonymity, differential pri-
vacy protects against a wide range of attacks, including
attacks using auxiliary information [53, 42, 44, 15].
Current research on differential privacy focuses on
development of new algorithms, called mechanisms, to
achieve differential privacy for a particular class of
queries. Researchers have developed dozens of mecha-
nisms covering a broad range of use cases, from general-
purpose statistical queries [19, 43, 38, 39, 46, 40, 10]
to special-purpose analytics tasks such as graph analy-
sis [29, 49, 32, 33, 12], range queries [28, 35, 36, 37, 56,
54, 13, 47, 8, 55], and analysis of data streams [20, 50].
Each mechanism works well for specific tasks and not as
well, or not at all, on other tasks.
Despite extensive academic research and an abundant
supply of mechanisms, differential privacy has not been
widely adopted in practice. Existing applications of dif-
ferential privacy in practice are limited to specialized use
cases such as web browsing statistics [24] and keyboard
and emoji use [2].
There are two major challenges for practical adop-
tion of differential privacy. The first is seamless inte-
gration into real-world data environments. These envi-
ronments include highly customized data architectures
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and industrial-grade database engines carefully tuned for
performance and reliability. Previous differential privacy
systems require changes to the data pipeline [31] or re-
placement of the database with a custom engine [40, 46,
39] and hence do not integrate easily into these environ-
ments.
The second challenge is simultaneously supporting
different mechanisms. Current evidence suggests that
there is no single “best mechanism” that performs op-
timally for all queries. Rather, the best mechanism de-
pends on both the query and the dataset. In fact, as
demonstrated by Hay et al. [30], the best mechanism can
also vary with the size of the dataset even for a single
query. A practical solution must provide flexibility for
mechanism selection and easy integration of new mecha-
nisms. Previous differential privacy systems [31, 40, 46]
implement only a single mechanism.
The CHORUS system. This paper describes CHORUS,
a system with a novel architecture for providing differ-
ential privacy for statistical SQL queries. The key in-
sight of our approach is to embed the differential pri-
vacy mechanism into the SQL query before execution, so
the query automatically enforces differential privacy on
its own output. We define a SQL query with this prop-
erty as an intrinsically private query. CHORUS automat-
ically converts untrusted input queries into intrinsically
private queries. This approach enables a new architec-
ture in which queries are rewritten, then submitted to an
unmodified database management system (DBMS).
This new architecture addresses the two major chal-
lenges outlined above. First, CHORUS is compatible with
any SQL database that supports standard math functions
(rand, ln, etc.) thus avoiding the need for a custom run-
time or modifications to the database engine. By us-
ing a standard SQL database engine instead of a custom
runtime, CHORUS can leverage the reliability, scalability
and performance of modern databases, which are built on
decades of research and engineering experience.
Second, CHORUS enables the modular implementa-
tion and adoption of many different mechanisms, sup-
porting a significantly higher percentage of queries than
any single mechanism and providing increased flexibil-
ity for both general and specialized use cases. CHORUS
automatically selects a mechanism for each input query
based on an extensible set of selection rules.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing system pro-
vides these capabilities. CHORUS also protects against
an untrusted analyst: even if the submitted query is ma-
licious, our transformation rules ensure that the executed
query returns only differentially private results. The re-
sults can thus be returned directly to the analyst without
post-processing. This enables easy integration into exist-
ing data environments via a single pre-processing step.
We demonstrate the CHORUS approach with four ex-
isting general-purpose differential privacy mechanisms:
Elastic Sensitivity [31], Restricted Sensitivity [10],
Weighted PINQ [19] and Sample & Aggregate [40].
These mechanisms support a range of SQL features and
analytic tasks. CHORUS contains query transforma-
tion rules for each mechanism which convert untrusted
(non–intrinsically private) queries into intrinsically pri-
vate queries. We also describe how additional mecha-
nisms can be added to CHORUS.
Deployment. CHORUS is currently being deployed at
Uber for its internal analytics tasks. CHORUS represents
a significant part of the company’s General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR) [4] compliance efforts, and
provides both differential privacy and access control en-
forcement. We have made CHORUS available as open
source [3] to enable additional deployments elsewhere.
Evaluation. In the first evaluation of its kind, we use
CHORUS to evaluate the utility and performance of the
selected mechanisms on real data. Our dataset includes
18,774 real queries written by analysts at Uber.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following
contributions:
1. We present CHORUS, representing a novel architec-
ture for enforcing differential privacy on SQL queries
that simultaneously supports a wide variety of mech-
anisms and runs on any standard SQL database (§ 3).
2. We describe and formalize the novel use of rule-based
query rewriting to automatically transform an un-
trusted SQL query into an intrinsically private query
using four example general-purpose mechanisms. We
describe how other mechanisms can be supported us-
ing the same approach (§ 4, 5).
3. We report on our experience deploying CHORUS to
enforce differential privacy at Uber, where it pro-
cesses more than 10,000 queries per day (§ 6).
4. We use CHORUS to conduct the first large-scale em-
pirical evaluation of the utility and performance of
multiple general-purpose differential privacy on real
queries and data (§ 7).
2 Background
Differential privacy provides a formal guarantee of in-
distinguishability. This guarantee is defined in terms of
a privacy budget ε—the smaller the budget, the stronger
the guarantee. The formal definition of differential pri-
vacy is written in terms of the distance d(x,y) between
two databases, i.e. the number of entries on which they
2
General- Sensitivity
Mechanism Purpose Strengths Supported Constructs Measure Algorithmic Requirements
Elastic Sensitivity [31] X General analytics Counting queries w/ joins Local Laplace noise
Restricted Sensitivity [10] X Graph analysis Counting queries w/ joins Global Laplace noise
WPINQ [46] X Synthetic data gen. Counting queries w/ joins Global Weighted dataset operations,
Laplace noise
Sample & Aggregate [51] X Statistical estimators Single-table aggregations Local Subsampling, Widened Win-
sorized mean, Laplace noise
Table 1: Differential privacy mechanisms
differ: d(x,y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}|. Two databases x and y
are neighbors if d(x,y) = 1. A randomized mechanism
K : Dn → R preserves (ε,δ )-differential privacy if for
any pair of neighboring databases x,y ∈ Dn and set S of
possible outputs:
Pr[K (x) ∈ S]≤ eεPr[K (y) ∈ S]+δ
Differential privacy can be enforced by adding noise
to the non-private results of a query. The scale of this
noise depends on the sensitivity of the query. The lit-
erature considers two different measures of sensitivity:
global [19] and local [43]. For more on differential pri-
vacy, see Dwork and Roth [22].
Statistical queries. Differential privacy aims to protect
the privacy of individuals in the context of statistical
queries. In SQL terms, these are queries using standard
aggregation operators (COUNT, AVG, etc.) as well as his-
tograms created via the GROUP BY operator in which
aggregations are applied to records within each group.
Differential privacy is not suitable for queries that return
raw data (e.g. rows in the database) since such queries
are inherently privacy-violating. We formalize the tar-
geted class of queries in Section 5.1. In Section 5.5 we
discuss how our approach supports histogram queries,
which require special care to avoid leaking information
via the presence of absence of groups.
Mechanism design. Research on differential privacy has
produced a large and growing number of differential pri-
vacy mechanisms. Some mechanisms are designed to
provide broad support for many types of queries [19, 43,
38, 39, 46, 40, 10], while others are designed to produce
maximal utility for a particular application [29, 49, 32,
33, 12, 28, 35, 37, 56, 54, 13, 47, 8, 55, 24, 30].
While mechanisms adopt unique strategies for enforc-
ing differential privacy in their target domain, they gen-
erally share a common set of design choices and algo-
rithmic components. For example, many mechanisms re-
quire addition of Laplace noise to the result of the query.
Our approach is motivated by the observation that a
wide range of distinct mechanisms can supported with
a common set of algorithmic building blocks. In this
paper we formalize several example building blocks via
transformation rules that describe how each algorithmic
component can be embedded within a SQL query. We
demonstrate the flexibility of this design by showing that
each mechanism can be implemented simply by compos-
ing these transformation rules according to the mecha-
nism’s definition.
General-purpose mechanisms. The four mechanisms
in Table 1 are general-purpose because they support a
broad range of queries, including commonly used SQL
constructs such as join. This paper focuses on these four
mechanisms. Many more specialized mechanisms have
substantially similar algorithmic requirements and can be
supported as intrinsically private queries using variations
of the transformation rules introduced in this paper. Sec-
tion 7.5 discusses this subject in more detail.
3 The CHORUS Architecture
This section presents the system architecture and advan-
tages of CHORUS, and compares it against existing ar-
chitectures for differentially private analytics. We first
describe the design goals motivating the CHORUS archi-
tecture. Then, in Section 3.1, we describe the limitations
of existing architectures preventing previous work from
attaining these goals. Finally, Section 3.2 describes the
novel architecture of CHORUS and provides an overview
of our approach.
Design Goals. The design of CHORUS is motivated
by the desire to enforce differential privacy for general-
purpose analytics in a practical setting. To that end,
CHORUS has the following design goals:
1. Usability for non-experts
2. Support for a wide variety of analytics queries
3. Easy integration with existing data environments
As we will demonstrate in the next section, achieving
these goals is challenging, and no existing system man-
ages to achieve all three. To achieve the first goal, a
system should work with standard query languages (e.g.
SQL). To achieve the second goal, a system should be
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able to leverage the many differential privacy mecha-
nisms listed in Table 1, and should select a mechanism
for a given query automatically. To achieve the third
goal, a system should be deployable in the context of an
existing database engine.
3.1 Existing Architectures
Existing systems for enforcing differential privacy for
data analytics tasks adopt one of two architecture types:
they are either deeply integrated systems or post pro-
cessing systems. These architectures are summarized
in Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b). PINQ [39], Weighted
PINQ [46], GUPT [40], and Airavat [48] follow the
deep integration architecture: each one provides its own
specialized DBMS, and cannot be used with a standard
DBMS.
Elastic sensitivity [31] uses the post processing archi-
tecture, in which the original query is run on the database
and noise is added to the final result. This approach sup-
ports mechanisms that do not modify the semantics of
the original query (PINQ and Restricted sensitivity [10]
could also be implemented this way), and has the advan-
tage that it is compatibile with existing DBMSs. How-
ever, the post processing architecture is fundamentally
incompatible with mechanisms that change how the orig-
inal query executes—including WPINQ and Sample &
Aggregate, listed in Table 1.
The deeply integrated and post processing architec-
tures in Figure 1(a) and (b) therefore both fail to address
two major challenges in implementing a practical system
for differentially private data analytics:
• Custom DBMSs are unlikely to achieve parity with
mature DBMSs for a wide range of features includ-
ing rich SQL support, broad query optimization, high-
performance transaction support, recoverability, scal-
ability and distribution.
• Neither architecture supports the simultaneous appli-
cation of a large number of different mechanisms. The
deeply integrated architecture requires building a new
DBMS for each mechanism, while the post process-
ing architecture is inherently incompatible with some
mechanisms.
3.2 The CHORUS Architecture
In CHORUS, we propose a novel alternative to the deeply
integrated and post processing architectures used by ex-
isting systems. As shown in Figure 1(c), CHORUS trans-
forms the input query into an intrinsically private query,
which is a standard SQL query whose results are guar-
anteed to be differentially private.
An intrinsically private query provides this guarantee
by embedding a differential privacy mechanism in the
query itself. When executed on an unmodified SQL da-
tabase, the embedded privacy mechanism ensures that
the query’s results preserve differential privacy. The ap-
proach has three key advantages over previous work:
• CHORUS is DBMS-independent (unlike the deeply in-
tegrated approach): it requires neither modifying the
database nor switching to purpose-built database en-
gines. Our approach can therefore leverage existing
high-performance DBMSs to scale to big data.
• CHORUS can implement a wide variety of privacy-
preserving techniques. Unlike the post processing ap-
proach, CHORUS is compatible with all of the mecha-
nisms listed in Table 1, and many more.
• CHORUS eliminates the need for post-processing, al-
lowing easy integration in existing data processing
pipelines. Our approach enables a single data process-
ing pipeline for all mechanisms.
By adopting this novel architecture, CHORUS achieves
all three design goals listed earlier. Since input queries
are considered untrusted and the rewriting engine uses
program analysis techniques, CHORUS preserves differ-
ential privacy even in the face of malicious analysts.
CHORUS’s architecture is specifically designed to be
easily integrated into existing data environments. We re-
port on the deployment of CHORUS at Uber in Section 6.
Constructing intrinsically private queries. The pri-
mary challenge in implementing this architecture is
transforming untrusted queries into intrinsically private
queries. This process must be flexible enough to support
a wide variety of privacy mechanisms and also general
enough to support ad-hoc SQL queries.
As described earlier, constructing intrinsically private
queries automatically has additional advantages. This
approach protects against malicious analysts by guaran-
teeing differentially private results by construction. It is
also transparent to the analyst since it does not require
input from the analyst to preserve privacy or select a pri-
vacy mechanism.
As shown in Figure 1(c), CHORUS constructs intrinsi-
cally private queries in two steps:
1. The Mechanism Selection component automatically
selects an appropriate differential privacy mecha-
nism to apply.
2. The Query Rewriting component embeds the se-
lected mechanism in the input query, transforming
it into an intrinsically private query.
To select a mechanism, CHORUS leverages an exten-
sible mechanism selection engine, discussed next. The
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CHORUS
Mechanism Selection
Selection Rules
Query Rewriting
Original 
Database
SQL 
Query
Intrinsically 
Private 
Query
Deep Integration
Mechanism
Specialized Database Engine
SQL 
Query
Differentially 
Private Results Differentially 
Private Results
Post Processing
SQL 
Query
Differentially 
Private Results
Output Perturbation
Original 
Database
Sensitive 
Results
(a) (b) (c)
Sensitivity Mechanism
Sensitivity Mechanism
Mechanism
Pros:
• Broad mechanism support
Cons:
• Higher software complexity
• New system required for each
mechanism
Pros:
• DBMS-independent
Cons:
• Supports only post-processing
mechanisms
Pros:
• DBMS-independent
• Broad mechanism support
Figure 1: Existing architectures: (a), (b); architecture of CHORUS: (c).
query rewriting step then transforms the input query to
produce an intrinsically private query embedding the se-
lected mechanism. For this step, we employ a novel use
of rule-based query rewriting, which has been studied ex-
tensively for query optimization but, to our knowledge,
never applied to differential privacy. We introduce our
solution by example in Section 4and formalize it in Sec-
tion 5. This paper focuses on differential privacy, but the
same approach could be used to enforce other types of
privacy guarantees or security policies [52].
Mechanism selection. CHORUS implements an exten-
sible mechanism selection engine that automatically se-
lects a differential privacy mechanism for each input
query. This engine can be extended based on available
mechanisms, performance and utility goals, and to sup-
port custom mechanism selection techniques. For exam-
ple, Hay et al. [34] demonstrate that a machine learning-
based approach can leverage properties of the data to se-
lect a mechanism most likely to yield high utility. CHO-
RUS is designed to support any such approach. We de-
scribe an example of a syntax-based mechanism selec-
tion in Section 6.
Privacy budget management. CHORUS does not pre-
scribe a specific privacy budget management strategy,
as the best way to manage the available privacy budget
in practice will depend on the deployment scenario and
threat model. CHORUS provides flexibility in how the
budget is managed: the sole requirement is that rewriters
are supplied with the ε value apportioned to each query.1
1For simplicity we consider approaches where CHORUS stores the
budget directly. However, our query rewriting approach could allow
the DBMS to assist with budget accounting, for example by storing
For the case of a single global budget, where CHORUS
is deployed as the sole interface to the database, CHORUS
can track the remaining budget according to the standard
composition theorem for differential privacy [19]. When
a new query is submitted, CHORUS subtracts from the
remaining budget the ε value allocated to that query, and
refuses to process new queries when the budget is ex-
hausted. In Section 7.5, we discuss more sophisticated
methods that may yield better results for typical deploy-
ments.
4 Query Rewriting
This section demonstrates our approach by example, us-
ing the four general-purpose differential privacy mecha-
nisms listed in Table 1. For each mechanism, we briefly
review the algorithm used. Then, we describe, using sim-
ple example queries, how an input SQL query can be
systematically transformed into an intrinsically private
query embedding that algorithm, and give an argument
for the correctness of each transformation.
4.1 Sensitivity-Based Mechanisms
We first consider two mechanisms that add noise to the
final result of the query: Elastic Sensitivity [31] and Re-
stricted Sensitivity [10]. Elastic Sensitivity is a bound on
the local sensitivity of a query, while Restricted Sensitiv-
ity is based on global sensitivity. Both approaches add
Laplace noise to the query’s result.
For a query with sensitivity s returning value v, the
Laplace mechanism releases v+ Lap(s/ε), where ε is
the privacy budget allocated to the query. Given a ran-
ε values in a separate table and referencing and updating the values
within the rewritten query.
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dom variable U sampled from the uniform distribution,
we can compute the value of a random variable X ∼
Lap(s/ε):
X =− s
ε
sign(U) ln(1−2|U |)
In SQL, we can sample from the uniform distribution us-
ing RANDOM(). Consider the following query, which returns
a (non–differentially private) count of trips in the data-
base. This query can be transformed into an intrinsically
private query as follows:
SELECT COUNT(∗) AS count FROM trips
⇓
WITH orig AS (SELECT COUNT(∗) AS count FROM trips),
uniform AS (SELECT ∗, RANDOM ()-0.5 AS u
FROM orig)
⇓
WITH orig AS (SELECT COUNT(∗) AS count FROM trips),
uniform AS (SELECT ∗, RANDOM ()-0.5 AS u
FROM orig)
SELECT count-( s/ε )∗SIGN(u)∗LN(1-2∗ABS(u)) AS count
FROM uniform
The first step defines U using RANDOM(), and the second
uses U to compute the corresponding Laplace noise.
The correctness of this approach follows from the def-
inition of the Laplace mechanism. The two transforma-
tion steps combined clearly generate Laplace noise with
the correct scale, and add it to the sensitive query results.
CHORUS can calculate either Elastic Sensitivity with
smoothing via smooth sensitivity [43]2 or Restricted
Sensitivity via a dataflow analysis of the query. Such
an analysis is described in [31].
We formalize the construction of intrinsically private
queries via sensitivity-based approaches using the La-
place Noise transformation, defined in Section 5.
4.2 Weighted PINQ
Weighted PINQ (WPINQ) enforces differential privacy
for counting queries with equijoins. A key distinction
of this mechanism is that it produces a differentially pri-
vate metric (called a weight), rather than a count. These
weights are suitable for use in a workflow that generates
differentially private synthetic data, from which counts
are easily derived. The workflow described in [46]
uses weights as input to a Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) process.
CHORUS’s implementation of WPINQ computes
noisy weights for a given counting query according to
the mechanism’s definition [46]. Since the weights are
differentially private, they can be released to the analyst
for use with any desired workflow.
2Smooth sensitivity guarantees ε,δ -differential privacy, and incor-
porates the setting of δ into the smoothed sensitivity value.
The WPINQ mechanism adds a weight to each row
of the database, updates the weights as the query ex-
ecutes to ensure that the query has a sensitivity of 1,
and uses the Laplace mechanism to add noise to the
weighted query result. WPINQ has been implemented
as a standalone data processing engine with a special-
ized query language, but has not been integrated into any
SQL DBMS.
Where a standard database is a collection of tuples
in Dn, a weighted database (as defined in Proserpio et
al. [46]) is a function from a tuple to its weight (D→R).
In this setting, counting the number of tuples with a par-
ticular property is analogous to summing the weights of
all such tuples. Counting queries can therefore be per-
formed using sum.
In fact, summing weights in a weighted dataset pro-
duces exactly the same result as the corresponding count-
ing query on the original dataset, when the query does
not contain joins. When the query does contain joins,
WPINQ scales the weight of each row of the join’s out-
put to maintain a sensitivity of 1. Proserpio et al. [46]
define the weight of each row in a join as follows:
A./B =∑
k
Ak×BTk
||Ak||+ ||Bk|| (1)
Since the scaled weights ensure a sensitivity of 1, La-
place noise scaled to 1/ε is sufficient to enforce differ-
ential privacy. WPINQ adds noise with this scale to the
results of the weighted query.
In SQL, we can accomplish the first task (adding
weights) by adding a column to each relation. Consider
transforming our previous example query:
SELECT COUNT(∗) FROM trips
⇓
SELECT SUM(weight)
FROM (SELECT ∗, 1 AS weight FROM trips)
This transformation adds a weight of 1 to each row in the
table, and changes the COUNT aggregation function into a
SUM of the rows’ weights. The correctness of this trans-
formation is easy to see: as required by WPINQ [46], the
transformed query adds a weight to each row, and uses
SUM in place of COUNT.
We can accomplish the second task (scaling weights
for joins) by first calculating the norms ||AK || and ||Bk||
for each key k, then the new weights for each row using
Ak×BTk . For a join between the trips and drivers tables,
for example, we can compute the norms for each key:
WITH tnorms AS (SELECT driver id ,
SUM(weight) AS norm
FROM trips
GROUP BY driver id ),
dnorms AS (SELECT id, SUM(weight) AS norm
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FROM drivers
GROUP BY id)
Then, we join the norms relations with the original re-
sults and scale the weight for each row:
SELECT ...,
(t.weight∗d.weight )/(tn.norm+dn.norm) AS weight
FROM trips t, drivers d, tnorm tn, dnorm dn
WHERE t. driver id = d.id
AND t. driver id = tn. driver id
AND d.id = dn.id
The correctness of this transformation follows from
equation (1). The relation tnorms corresponds to ||Ak||,
and dnorms to ||Bk||. For each key, t.weight corresponds to
Ak, and d.weight to Bk.
Finally, we can accomplish the third task (adding La-
place noise scaled to 1/ε) as described earlier.
We formalize the construction of intrinsically private
queries via WPINQ using three transformations: the
Metadata Propagation transformation to add weights to
each row, the Replace Aggregation Function transforma-
tion to replace counts with sums of weights, and the La-
place Noise transformation to add noise to the results.
All three are defined in Section 5.
4.3 Sample & Aggregate
The Sample & Aggregate [43, 51] mechanism works for
all statistical estimators, but does not support joins. Sam-
ple & Aggregate has been implemented in GUPT [40],
a standalone data processing engine that operates on
Python programs, but has never been integrated into a
practical database. As defined by Smith [51], the mech-
anism has three steps:
1. Split the database into disjoint subsamples
2. Run the query on each subsample independently
3. Aggregate the results using a differentially-private
algorithm
For differentially-private aggregation, Smith [51] sug-
gests Widened Winsorized mean. Intuitively, Widened
Winsorized mean first calculates the interquartile
range—the difference between the 25th and 75th per-
centile of the subsampled results. Next, the algorithm
widens this range to include slightly more data points,
then clamps the subsampled results to lie within the
widened range. This step eliminates outliers, which is
important for enforcing differential privacy. Finally, the
algorithm takes the average of the clamped results, and
adds Laplace noise scaled to the size of the range (i.e. the
effective sensitivity) divided by ε .
In SQL, we can accomplish tasks 1 and 2 by adding
a GROUP BY clause to the original query. Consider a query
that computes the average of trip lengths:
SELECT AVG( trip distance ) FROM trips
⇓
SELECT AVG( trip distance ), ROW NUM () MOD n
AS samp
FROM trips
GROUP BY samp
This transformation generates n subsamples and runs the
original query on each one. The correctness of tasks 1
and 2 follows from the definition of subsampling: the
GROUP BY ensures that the subsamples are disjoint, and that
the query runs on each subsample independently. To ac-
complish task 3 (differentially private aggregation), we
can use a straightforward implementation of Widened
Winsorized mean in SQL, since the algorithm itself is
the same for each original query.
We formalize the construction of intrinsically private
queries via Sample & Aggregate using the Subsampling
transformation, defined in Section 5.
5 Formalization & Correctness
This section formalizes the construction of intrinsically
private queries as introduced in Section 4. We begin
by introducing notation (Section 5.1). We then define
reusable transformation rules (Section 5.2) that can be
composed to construct mechanisms. Next, we formalize
the four mechanisms described earlier in terms of these
rules (Section 5.3). Finally, we prove a correctness prop-
erty: our transformations do not modify the semantics of
the input query (Section 5.4).
By formalizing the transformation rules separately
from the individual mechanisms, we allow the rules to be
re-used in defining new mechanisms—taking advantage
of the common algorithmic requirements demonstrated
in Table 1. An additional benefit of this approach is the
ability to prove correctness properties of the rules them-
selves, so that these properties extend to all mechanisms
implemented using the rules.
5.1 Preliminaries
Core relational algebra. We formalize our transforma-
tions as rewriting rules on a core relational algebra that
represents general statistical queries. We define the core
relational algebra in Figure 2. This algebra includes the
most commonly-used features of query languages like
SQL: selection (σ ), projection (Π), equijoins (./), and
counting with and without aggregation. We also include
several features specifically necessary for our implemen-
tations: constant values, random numbers, and the arith-
metic functions ln, abs, and sign.
We use standard notation for relational algebra with a
few exceptions. We extend the projection operator Π to
attribute expressions, which allows projection to add new
named columns to a relation. For example, if relation r
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has schema U , then the expression ΠU∪weight:1r adds a
new column named “weight” with the default value 1 for
each row to the existing columns in r. In addition, we
combine aggregation and grouping, writing Count
a1..an
to in-
dicate a counting aggregation with grouping by columns
a1..an. We write Suma
a1..an
to indicate summation of column
a, grouping by columns a1..an.
Notation for rewriting rules. Each transformation is de-
fined as a set of inference rules that rewrites a relational
algebra expression. A particular rule allows rewriting an
expression as specified in its conclusion (below the line)
if the conditions specified in its antecedent (above the
line) are satisfied (either through syntactic properties of
the query or by applying another inference rule).
Our approach relies on the ability to analyze and
rewrite SQL queries. This rewriting can be achieved by
a rule-based query optimization engine [1, 5].
Most of the conditions specified in our rewriting rules
use standard notation. One exception is conditions of
the form Q : U , which we use to denote that the query
Q results in a relation with schema U . We extend this
notation to denote the schemas of database tables (e.g.
t : U) and relational expressions (e.g. r1 : U).
Some of our rewriting rules have global parameters,
which we denote by setting them above the arrow indi-
cating the rewriting rule itself. For example, r x→ Πxr
allows rewriting r to project only the column named x,
where the value of x is provided as a parameter. Most
parameters are values, but parameters can also be func-
tions mapping a relational algebra expression to a new
expression. For example, r
f→ f (r) indicates rewriting r
to the result of f (r).
5.2 Transformation Rules
Laplace Noise. All four mechanisms in Table 1 require
generating noise according to the Laplace distribution.
We accomplish this task using the Laplace Noise trans-
formation, defined in Figure 3. This transformation has
one parameter: γ , which defines the scale of the noise to
be added to the query’s result. For a query with sensitiv-
ity 1 and privacy budget ε , for example, γ = 1/ε suffices
to enforce differential privacy.
The Laplace Noise transformation defines a single in-
ference rule. This rule allows rewriting a top-level query
with schema U according to the Lap function. Lap wraps
the query in two projection operations; the first (defined
in Unif) samples the uniform distribution for each value
in the result, and the second (defined in Lap) uses this
value to add noise drawn from the Laplace distribution.
Attribute expressions
a attribute name
e ::= a | a : v
v ::= a | n ∈ N | v1 + v2 | v1 ∗ v2 | v1/v2
| rand() | randInt(n) | ln(v) | abs(v) | sign(v)
Relational transformations
R ::= t | R1 ./x=y R2 |Πe1,...,en R | σϕR
| Count(R) | Count
a1..an
(R)
Selection predicates
ϕ ::= e1θe2 | eθv
θ ::= < | ≤ | = | 6= | ≥ | >
Queries
Q ::= Count(R) | Count
a1..an
(R) | Suma(R) | Suma
a1..an
(R)
Figure 2: Syntax of core relational algebra
Q
γ→ Q Q : U
Q
γ→ Lap(Q)
where
Unif(Q) =ΠU∪{ux:rand()−0.5|x∈U}(Q))
Lap(Q) =Π{x:x+−γ sign(ux)ln(1−2abs(ux))|x∈U}(Unif(Q))
Figure 3: Laplace Noise Transformation
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R
i, j,c→ R r1
i, j,c→ r′1 r2
i, j,c→ r′2 r′1 : U1 r′2 : U2
r1 ./
A=B
r2
i, j,c→ j(r′1 ./A=B r
′
2)
t : U m 6∈U
t
i, j,c→ ΠU∪m:i()t
r
i, j,c→ r′
ΠU (r)
i, j,c→ ΠU∪{m}(r′)
r
i, j,c→ r′
σφ (r)
i, j,c→ σφ (r′)
r
i, j,c→ r′ Count(r′) : U
Count(r)
i, j,c→ ΠU∪m:c(r′)Count(r′)
r
i, j,c→ r′ Count
a1..an
(r′) : U
Count
a1..an
(r)
i, j,c→ ΠU∪m:c(r′)Counta1..an (r
′)
Q
i, j,c→ Q r
i, j,c→ r′
Count(r)
i, j,c→ Count(r′)
r
i, j,c→ r′
Count
a1..an
(r)
i, j,c→ Count
a1..an
(r′)
Figure 4: Metadata Propagation Transformation
Metadata Propagation. Many mechanisms require
tracking metadata about each row as the query executes.
To accomplish this, we define the Metadata Propagation
transformation in Figure 4. The Metadata Propagation
transformation adds a column to each referenced table
and initializes its value for each row in that table, then
uses the specified composition functions to compose the
values of the metadata column for each resulting row of
a join or an aggregation.
The Metadata Propagation transformation has three
parameters: i, a function defining the initial value of the
metadata attribute for each row in a database table; j, a
function specifying how to update the metadata column
for a join of two relations; and c, a function specifying
how to update the metadata column for subqueries.
The inference rule for a table t uses projection to add a
new attribute to t’s schema to hold the metadata, and ini-
tializes that attribute to the value of i(). The rules for pro-
jection and selection simply propagate the new attribute.
The rule for joins applies the j function to perform a lo-
calized update of the metadata column. The rules for
counting subqueries invoke the update function c to de-
termine the new value for the metadata attribute. Finally,
the rules for counting queries eliminate the metadata at-
tribute to preserve the top-level schema of the query.
Replacing Aggregation Functions. The Replace Ag-
gregation Function transformation, defined in Figure 5,
allows replacing one aggregation function (Γ) with an-
other (Γ′). To produce syntactically valid output, Γ and
Γ′ must be drawn from the set of available aggregation
Q
Γ,Γ′→ Q
Γ(r) Γ,Γ
′
→ Γ′(r) Γ
a1..an
(r)
Γ,Γ′→ Γ′
a1..an
(r)
Figure 5: Replace Aggregation Function Transformation
functions. The antecedent is empty in the rewriting rules
for this transformation because the rules operate only on
the outermost operation of the query.
Subsampling. The Subsampling transformation, defined
in Figure 6, splits the database into disjoint subsamples,
runs the original query on each subsample, and aggre-
gates the results according to a provided function. The
Subsampling transformation is defined in terms of the
Metadata Propagation transformation, and can be used
to implement partition-based differential privacy mecha-
nisms like Sample & Aggregate.
The parameters for the Subsampling transformation
areA , a function that aggregates the subsampled results,
and n, the number of disjoint subsamples to use during
subsampling. Both inference rules defined by the trans-
formation rewrite the queried relation using the Meta-
data Propagation transformation (r
i, j,c→ r′). The parame-
ters for Metadata Propagation initialize the metadata at-
tribute with a random subsample number between zero
and n, and propagate the subsample number over count-
ing subqueries. The update functions for joins and count-
ing subqueries is undefined, because subsampling is in-
compatible with queries containing these features.3
In order to satisfy the semantics preservation property,
the aggregation functionA must transform the query re-
sults on each subsample into a final result with the same
shape as the original query. Many aggregation functions
satisfy this property (e.g. the mean of all subsamples),
but not all of them provide differential privacy.
5.3 Mechanism Definitions
We now formally define the mechanisms described ear-
lier in terms of the transformations defined in Sec-
tion 5.2. We describe each mechanism as a series of one
or more transformations, and define the parameters for
each transformation to obtain the correct semantics for
the mechanism.
3Subsampling changes the semantics of joins, since join keys in
separate partitions will be prevented from matching. It also changes
the semantics of aggregations in subqueries, since the aggregation is
computed within a single subsample.
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Q A→ Q r
i, j,c→ r′
Count(r) A→A (Count
m
(r′))
r
i, j,c→ r′
Count
G1..Gn
(r) A→A ( Count
G1..Gn,m
(r′))
where i = randInt(n), j =⊥,c(r) =⊥,and A aggregates over m
Figure 6: Subsampling Transformation
Elastic Sensitivity
Let s be the Elastic Sensitivity of Q. Let γ = s/ε . If
Q
γ→ Q′, then Q′ is an intrinsically private query via
Elastic Sensitivity.
Restricted Sensitivity
Let s be the restricted sensitivity of Q. Let γ = s/ε . If
Q
γ→ Q′, then Q′ is an intrinsically private query via
Restricted Sensitivity.
Weighted PINQ
Let i = 1 and let j scale weights as described in Sec-
tion 4.2. Let γ = 1/ε . If Q i, j,c→ Q′ Γ,Γ
′
→ Q′′ γ→ Q′′′,
then Q′′′ is an intrinsically private query via Weighted
PINQ.
Sample & Aggregate
Let A implement private Winsorized mean [51] for a
desired ε . If Q A→Q′, then Q′ is an intrinsically private
query via Sample & Aggregate.
5.4 Correctness
The correctness criterion for a traditional query rewrit-
ing system is straightforward: the rewritten query should
have the same semantics (i.e. return the same results) as
the original query. For intrinsically private queries, how-
ever, the definition of correctness is less clear: enforcing
differential privacy requires modifying the results to pre-
serve privacy.
In this section, we define semantic preservation,
which formalizes the intuitive notion that our transfor-
mations should perturb the result attributes of the query,
as required for enforcing differential privacy, but change
nothing else about its semantics. Semantic preserva-
tion holds when the transformation in question preserves
the size and shape of the query’s output, and addition-
ally preserves its logical attributes. Logical attributes are
those which are used as join keys or to perform filtering
(i.e. the query makes decisions based on these attributes,
instead of simply outputting them).
Each of our transformations preserve this property.
Furthermore, semantic preservation is preserved over
composition of transformations, so semantic preser-
vation holds for any mechanism defined using our
transformations—including those defined in Section 5.3.
Definition 1 (Logical Attribute). An attribute a is a log-
ical attribute if it appears as a join key in a join expres-
sion, in the filter condition ϕ of a filter expression, or in
the set of grouping attributes of a Count or Sum expres-
sion.
Definition 2 (Semantic Preservation). A transformation
(→) satisfies semantic preservation if for all queries Q
and Q′, if Q→ Q′, then (1) the schema is preserved: Q :
U ⇒ Q′ : U; (2) the number of output rows is preserved:
|Q| = |Q′|; and (3) logical attributes are preserved (see
Definition 3).
Definition 3 (Logical Attribute Preservation). Consider
a transformation Q : U → Q′ : U. Split U into two sets
of attributes {Uk,Ua}, such that Uk contains all of the
attributes from U used as logical attributes in Q and Ua
contains all of the other attributes. Now construct Q′r
by renaming each attribute k ∈Uk in Q′ to k′. Then →
preserves logical attributes if there exists a one-to-one
relation E ⊆ Q×Q′r such that for all e ∈ E and k ∈Uk,
ek = ek′ .
Theorem 1 (Composition). If two transformations (→a
and →b) both satisfy semantic preservation, then their
composition (→c) satisfies semantic preservation: for all
queries Q, Q′, and Q′′, if Q→a Q′ →b Q′′ implies that
Q→c Q′′, and both→a and→b preserve semantics, then
→c preserves semantics.
Proof. Assume that→a and→b preserve semantics, and
Q→a Q′ →b Q′′. We have that: (1) Q : U , Q′ : U , and
Q : U ′′ ; (2) |Q| = |Q′| = |Q′′|; and (3) Q, Q′, and Q′′
contain the same logical attributes. Thus by Definition 2,
→c preserves semantics.
Theorem 2. The Laplace Noise transformation (Fig-
ure 3) satisfies the semantic preservation property.
Proof. The rules in Figure 3 define only one transforma-
tion, at the top level of the query. The Unif function adds
a column ux for each original column x; the Lap func-
tion consumes this column, replacing the original col-
umn x with its original value plus a value sampled from
the Laplace distribution. The outermost projection pro-
duces exactly the same set of attributes as the input query
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Q, preserving the schema; the transformation adds only
projection nodes, so the number of output rows is pre-
served; no join or select can occur at the top level of a
query, so no logical attributes are modified.
Theorem 3. The Metadata Propagation transformation
(Figure 4) satisfies the semantic preservation property.
Proof. The only rules that make major modifications to
the original query are those for joins and counts. The
other rules add a new attribute m and propagate it through
the query, but do not change the number or contents of
the rows of any relation. At the top level of the query
(i.e. q ∈ Q), the transformation eliminates the attribute
m. For queries without joins or subquery aggregations,
the Metadata Propagation transformation is the identity
transformation, so it satisfies semantic preservation.
We argue the remaining cases by induction on the
structure of Q.
Case r1 ./
A=B
r2. Let r = r1 ./
A=B
r2. If j does not change
the query’s semantics, except to update the attribute m
(i.e. r : U ⇒ r =ΠU−m j(r)), then the semantics of r are
preserved.
Case Count(r) and CountG1..Gn(r). The rule modifies
the m attribute, but does not modify any other attribute
or change the size of the relation, so semantics are pre-
served.
Theorem 4. The Replace Aggregation Function trans-
formation (Figure 5) satisfies the semantic preservation
property.
Proof. Aggregation function replacement has the poten-
tial to modify the values of the query’s results, but not
its shape or logical attributes. The transformation’s only
rule allows changing one function to another, but pre-
serves the grouping columns and number of functions.
The schema, number of rows, and logical attributes are
therefore preserved.
Theorem 5 (Subsampling preserves semantics). If the
aggregation function A aggregates over the m attribute,
then our Subsampling transformation (Figure 6) satisfies
the semantic preservation property.
Proof. We know that Q has the form Count(r) or
Count
G1..Gn,m
(r). By Theorem 3, we know that in either case, if
r
i, j,c→ r′, then r has the same semantics as r′. We proceed
by cases.
Case Q = Count(r). Let q1 = Countm(r′). By the def-
inition of the transformation, Q′ = A (q1). The query
q1 has exactly one row per unique value of m. Since
A aggregates over m, A (q1) has exactly one row, and
therefore preserves the semantics of Q.
Case Q = Count
G1..Gn,m
(r). Let q1 = Count
G1..Gn,m
(r′). By the defi-
nition of the transformation, Q′ =A (q1). The query q1
has exactly one row per unique tuple (G1..Gn,m). Since
A aggregates over m, A (q1) has exactly one row per
unique tuple (G1..Gn), and therefore preserves the se-
mantics of Q.
5.5 Handling Histogram Queries
SQL queries can use the GROUP BY operator to return a re-
lation representing a histogram, as in the following query
which counts the number of trips greater than 100 miles
in each city:
SELECT city id , COUNT(∗) as count FROM trips
WHERE distance > 100
GROUP BY city id
This type of query presents a problem for differential pri-
vacy because the presence or absence of a particular city
in the results reveals whether the count for that city was
zero.
The general solution to this problem is to require the
analyst to explicitly provide a set of desired bins, and
return a (noisy) count of zero for absent bins. Such an
approach is used, for example, in PINQ [39], Weighted
PINQ [46], and FLEX [31]. Unfortunately, this approach
impose an unfamiliar user experience and is burdensome
for the analyst, who is never allowed to view the results
directly.
For bins with finite domain, CHORUS provides a su-
perior solution by enumerating missing histogram bins
automatically in the rewritten query. The missing bins
are populated with empty aggregation values (e.g., 0 for
counts) before mechanism-specific rewriting, at which
point they are handled identically as non-empty bins.
This allows the full results of histogram queries to be re-
turned to the analyst without post-processing or interpo-
sition. If the domain cannot be enumerated (e.g., because
it is unbounded), CHORUS falls back to the approach de-
scribed above and does not release results directly to the
analyst.
This feature requires the operator to define a mapping
from columns that may be used in a GROUP BY clause to
the database field containing the full set of values from
that column’s domain. This information may be defined
manually or extracted from the database schema (e.g.,
via primary and foreign key constraints), and is provided
during initial deployment.
In this example, suppose the full set of city ids are
stored in column city id of table cities. Using this in-
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formation, CHORUS generates the following intermedi-
ate query:
WITH orig AS (
SELECT city id , COUNT(∗) as count FROM trips
WHERE distance > 100
GROUP BY city id
)
SELECT cities.city id ,
(CASE WHEN orig.count IS NULL THEN 0
ELSE orig.count END) as count
FROM orig RIGHT JOIN cities
ON orig. city id = cities. city id
The RIGHT JOIN ensures that exactly one row exists in the
output relation for each city id in cities, and the CASE ex-
pression outputs a zero for each missing city in the origi-
nal query’s results. The query thus contains every city id
value regardless of the semantics of the original query.
This intermediate query is then sent to the mechanism
rewriter, which adds noise to each bin as normal.
6 Implementation & Deployment
This section describes our implementation of CHORUS
and our experience deploying it to enforce differential
privacy at Uber.
6.1 Implementation
Our implementation of CHORUS automatically trans-
forms an input SQL query into an intrinsically private
query. CHORUS currently supports the four differential
privacy mechanisms discussed here, and is designed for
easy extension to new mechanisms. We have released
CHORUS as an open source project [3].
Our implementation is built on Apache Calcite [1],
a generic query optimization framework that transforms
input queries into a relational algebra tree and provides
facilities for transforming the tree and emitting a new
SQL query. We built a custom dataflow analysis and
rewriting framework on Calcite to support intrinsically
private queries. The framework, mechanism-specific
analyses, and rewriting rules are implemented in 5,096
lines of Java and Scala code.
The approach could also be implemented with other
query optimization frameworks or rule-based query
rewriters such as Starburst [45], ORCA [5], and Cas-
cades [26].
6.2 Privacy Budget Management
We have designed CHORUS to be flexible in its handling
of the privacy budget, since best approach in a given
setting is likely to depend on the domain and the kinds
of queries posed. A complete study of approaches for
managing the privacy budget is beyond the scope of this
work, but we outline some possible strategies here. We
describe the specific method used in our deployment in
the next subsection.
As described earlier, a simple approach to budget man-
agement involves standard composition. More sophis-
ticated methods for privacy budget accounting include
the advanced composition [23] and parallel composi-
tion [19], both of which are directly applicable in our
setting. For some mechanisms, the moments account [7]
could be used to further reduce privacy cost.
Support for other mechanisms. Mechanisms them-
selves can also have a positive effect on the privacy
budget, and many mechanisms have been designed to
provide improved accuracy for a workload of similar
queries. Many of these mechanisms are implemented in
terms of lower-level mechanisms (such as the Laplace
mechanism) that CHORUS already supports, and there-
fore could be easily integrated in CHORUS.
The sparse vector technique [21] answers a sequence
of queries, but only gives answers for queries in whose
results lie above a given threshold. The technique is im-
plemented in terms of the Laplace mechanism.
The Matrix Mechanism [36] and MWEM [28] algo-
rithms both answer a query workload by posing carefully
chosen queries on the private database using a lower-
level mechanism (e.g. the Laplace mechanism), then us-
ing the results to build a representation that can answer
the queries in the workload.
The Exponential Mechanism [38] enforces differential
privacy for queries that return categorical (rather than nu-
meric) data, by picking from the possible outputs with
probability generated from an analyst-provided scoring
function. This technique can be be implemented as an
intrinsically private query if the scoring function is given
in SQL; the transformed query can run the function on
each possible output and then pick from the possibilities
according to the generated distribution.
6.3 Deployment
CHORUS is currently being deployed to enforce differen-
tial privacy for analysts that query customer data at Uber.
The primary goals of this deployment are to protect the
privacy of customers from insider attacks, and to en-
sure compliance with the requirements of Europe’s Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [4]. In the cur-
rent deployment, CHORUS processes more than 10,000
queries per day.
Data environment & architecture. The data environ-
ment into which CHORUS is deployed consists of several
DBMSs (three primary databases, plus several more for
specific applications), and a single central query inter-
face through which all queries are submitted. The query
interface is implemented as a microservice that performs
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query processing and then submits the query to the ap-
propriate DBMS and returns the results.
Our deployment involves a minimal wrapper around
the CHORUS library to expose its rewriting functional-
ity as a microservice. The only required change to the
data environment was a single modification to the query
interface, to submit queries to the CHORUS microser-
vice for rewriting before execution. The wrapper around
CHORUS also queries a policy microservice to determine
the security and privacy policy for the user submitting
the query. This policy informs which rewriter is used—
by default, differential privacy is required, but for some
privileged users performing specific business tasks, dif-
ferential privacy is only used for older data.
A major challenge of this deployment has been sup-
porting the variety of SQL dialects used by the various
DBMSs. The Calcite framework is intended to provide
support for multiple dialects, but this support is incom-
plete and we have had to make changes to Calcite in or-
der to support custom SQL dialects such as Vertica.
Privacy budget. The privacy budget is managed by the
microservice wrapper around CHORUS. The microser-
vice maintains a small amount of state to keep track of
the current cumulative privacy cost of all queries submit-
ted so far, and updates this state when a new query is
submitted.
The current design of the CHORUS microservice main-
tains a single global budget, and uses advanced compo-
sition [22] to track the total budget used for the queries
submitted so far.
As we gain experience with the deployment, we are
beginning to consider more sophisticated budget man-
agement approaches that take advantages of properties
of the data and the query workload. For example, new
data is added to the database continuously in this partic-
ular use case, so recent work leveraging the growth of the
database to answer an unbounded number of queries [14]
may be directly applicable.
Mechanism selection. Our deployment of CHORUS
leverages a syntax-based selection procedure which aims
to optimize for utility (low error). As we show in Sec-
tion 7.4, this approach performs well for this deploy-
ment. For different query workloads, other approaches
may work significantly better, and CHORUS is designed
to support extension to these cases.
The syntax-based approach uses a set of rules that
map SQL constructs supported by each mechanism to a
heuristic scoring function indicating how likely queries
using that construct will yield high utility. For example,
Restricted sensitivity [10] supports counting queries with
joins, but does not support many-to-many joins. Elastic
sensitivity [31] supports a wider set of equijoins, includ-
ing many-to-many joins, but generally provides slightly
lower utility than Restricted sensitivity due to smooth-
ing. Sample & aggregate [51] does not support joins, but
does support additional aggregation functions (including
“average” and “median”).
When a query is submitted, the mechanism selection
engine analyzes the query to determine its syntactic prop-
erties including how many joins it has, of what type,
and what aggregation functions it uses. It then applies
the rules to determine which mechanisms can support
the query and selects the mechanism with highest score.
Note this process does not depend on the data and hence
does not consume privacy budget.
This approach represents a simple but effective strat-
egy for automatic mechanism selection. In Section 7.4,
we demonstrate that our rules are effective for select-
ing the best mechanism on a real-world query workload.
This approach is also easily extended when a new mecha-
nism is added: the mechanism designer simply adds new
rules for SQL constructs supported by the mechanism.
Moreover, the scoring function can be tuned for other
objectives, for example favoring mechanisms achieving
low performance overhead rather than highest utility.
7 Evaluation
This section reports results of the following experiments:
• We report the percentage of queries that can be sup-
ported by each mechanism as intrinsically privacy
queries using a corpus of real-world queries, demon-
strating that a combination of the four evaluated
mechanisms covers 93.9% of these queries.
• We use CHORUS to conduct the first empirical study
of several differential privacy mechanisms on a real-
world SQL workload. We report the performance
overhead and utility of each mechanism across its sup-
ported class of queries.
• We demonstrate that our rule-based approach for auto-
matic mechanism selection is effective at selecting the
best mechanism for each input query. Using the sim-
ple set of rules presented earlier, our approach selects
the optimal mechanism for nearly 90% of the queries
in our corpus.
Corpus. We use a corpus of 18,774 real-world queries
containing all statistical queries executed by data ana-
lysts at Uber during October 2016.
The corpus includes queries written for several use
cases including fraud detection, marketing, business in-
telligence and general data exploration. It is therefore
highly diverse and representative of SQL data analytics
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Elastic	Sensitivity
Restricted	Sensitivity
WPINQ
Sample	&	Aggregate
13,413	queries	(71.4%)
10,821	queries	(57.6%)
8,532	queries	(45.4%)
5,698	queries	(30.3%)
Supported	by	at	least	one	mechanism
17,628	queries	(93.9%)
Figure 7: Size and relationship of query sets supported
by each evaluated mechanism.
queries generally. The queries were executed on a data-
base of data sampled from the production database.
7.1 Mechanism Support for Queries
Each mechanism evaluated supports a different subset of
queries. This is due to the unique limitations and sup-
ported constructs of each mechanism, as summarized in
Section 3. We measured the percentage of queries from
our corpus supported by each mechanism to assess that
mechanism’s coverage on a real-world workload. Fig-
ure 7 depicts the relative size and overlap of each set of
supported queries for the evaluated mechanisms. Elastic
Sensitivity is the most general mechanism and can sup-
port 71.4% of the queries in our corpus, followed by Re-
stricted Sensitivity (57.6%), WPINQ (30.3%) and Sam-
ple & Aggregate (45.4%).
Elastic Sensitivity and Restricted Sensitivity support
largely the same class of queries, and WPINQ supports
a subset of the queries supported by these two mecha-
nisms. In Section 7.5 we discuss limitations preventing
the use of WPINQ for certain classes of queries sup-
ported by Elastic Sensitivity and Restricted Sensitivity.
Sample & Aggregate supports some queries supported
by other mechanisms (counting queries that do not use
join), as well as a class of queries using statistical esti-
mators (such as sum and average), that are not supported
by the other mechanisms. In total, 93.9% of queries are
supported by at least one of the four mechanisms.
The results highlight a key advantage of our approach:
different classes of queries can be simultaneously sup-
ported via selection of one or more specialized mecha-
nisms. This ensures robust support across a wide range
of general and specialized use cases, and allows incre-
mental adoption of future state-of-the-art mechanisms.
7.2 Performance Overhead
We conduct a performance evaluation demonstrating the
performance overhead of each mechanism when imple-
mented as an intrinsically private query.
Overhead (%) Primary cause
Mean Median of overhead
Elastic Sensitivity 2.8 1.7 Random noise gen.
Restricted Sensitivity 3.2 1.6 Random noise gen.
WPINQ 50.9 21.6 Additional joins
Sample & Aggregate 587 394 Grouping/aggregation
Table 2: Performance overhead of evaluated differential
privacy mechanisms.
Figure 8: Performance overhead of differential privacy
mechanisms by execution time of original query.
Experiment Setup. We used a single HP Vertica
7.2.3 [6] node containing 300 million records including
trips, rider and driver information and other associated
data stored across 8 tables. We submitted the queries
locally and ran queries sequentially to avoid any effects
from network latency and concurrent workloads.
To establish a baseline we ran each original query 10
times and recorded the average after dropping the low-
est and highest times to control for outliers. For every
mechanism, we used CHORUS to transform each of the
mechanism’s supported queries into an intrinsically pri-
vate query. We executed each intrinsically private query
10 times and recorded the average execution time, again
dropping the fastest and slowest times. We calculate the
overhead for each query by comparing the average run-
time of the intrinsically private query against its base-
line.4
Results. The results are presented in Table 2. The aver-
age overhead and median overhead for Elastic Sensitivity
are 2.82% and 1.7%, for Restricted Sensitivity these are
3.2% and 1.6%, for WPINQ 50.9% and 21.58% and for
Sample & Aggregate 587% and 394%.
Figure 9 shows the distribution of overhead as a func-
tion of original query execution time. This distribution
shows that the percentage overhead is highest when the
4Transformation time is negligible and therefore not included in the
overhead calculation. The transformation time averages a few millisec-
onds, compared with an average query execution time of 1.5 seconds.
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original query was very fast (less than 100ms). This is
because even a small incremental performance cost is
fractionally larger for these queries. The values reported
in Table 2 are therefore a conservative estimate of the
overhead apparent to the analyst.
WPINQ and Sample & Aggregate significantly alter
the way the query executes (see Section 4) and these
changes increase query execution time. In the case of
WPINQ, the query transformation adds a new join to
the query each time weights are rescaled (i.e. one new
join for each join in the original query), and these new
joins result in the additional overhead. Sample & Aggre-
gate requires additional grouping and aggregation steps.
We hypothesize that these transformations are difficult
for the database to optimize during execution. Figure 9
shows that, in both cases, the performance impact is
amortized over higher query execution times, resulting
in a lower relative overhead for more expensive queries.
7.3 Utility of Selected Mechanisms
CHORUS enables the first empirical study of the utility
of many differential privacy mechanisms on a real-world
query workload. This experiment reveals innate trends of
each mechanism on a common database and query work-
load. For each differential privacy mechanism, this ex-
periment reports the relative magnitude of error added to
results of its supported query set. We present the results
as a function of query sample size, discussed below.
Experiment Setup. We use the same setup described in
the previous section to evaluate the utility of Elastic Sen-
sitivity, Restricted Sensitivity, and Sample & Aggregate.
As described in Section 4.2, WPINQ’s output is a differ-
entially private statistic used as input to a post-processing
step, rather than an answer to the query posed, so we do
not measure WPINQ’s utility.
For each query, we set the privacy budget ε = 0.1
for all mechanisms. For Elastic Sensitivity, we set δ =
n−ε lnn (where n is the database size), following Dwork
and Lei [18]. For Sample & Aggregate, we set the num-
ber of subsamples `= n0.4, following Mohan et al. [40].
We ran each intrinsically private query 10 times on the
database and report the median relative error across these
executions. For each run we report the relative error as
the percentage difference between the differentially pri-
vate result and the original non-private result. Consistent
with previous evaluations of differential privacy [30] we
report error as a proxy for utility since data analysts are
primarily concerned with accuracy of results.
If a query returns multiple rows (e.g., histogram
queries) we calculate the mean error across all histogram
bins. If the query returns multiple columns we treat each
output column independently since noise is applied sep-
arately to every column.
Query Sample Size. Our corpus includes queries cover-
ing a broad spectrum of use cases, from highly selective
analytics (e.g., trips in San Francisco completed in the
past hour) to statistics of large populations (e.g., all trips
in the US). Differential privacy generally requires the ad-
dition of more noise to highly selective queries than to
queries over large populations, since the influence of any
individual’s data diminishes as population size increases.
Consequently, a query’s selectivity is important for inter-
preting the relative error introduced by differential pri-
vacy. To measure the selectivity we calculate the sample
size of every aggregation function in the original query,
which represents the number of input records to which
the function was applied.
Results. Figures 9 and 10 show the results of this experi-
ment. All three mechanisms exhibit the expected inverse
relationship between sample size and error; moreover,
this trend is apparent for queries with and without joins.
Where the other three mechanisms support only count-
ing queries, Sample & Aggregate supports all statistical
estimators. Figure 10 shows the utility results for Sam-
ple & Aggregate, highlighting the aggregation function
used. These results indicate that Sample & Aggregate
can provide high utility (<10% error) for each of its sup-
ported aggregation functions on approximately half of
the queries.
7.4 Automatic Mechanism Selection
We evaluated the effectiveness of the syntax-based auto-
matic mechanism selection approach described in Sec-
tion 6.For each query in our corpus, this experiment
compares the utility achieved by the mechanism selected
by our rule-based approach to the best possible utility
achievable by any mechanism implemented in CHORUS.
Experiment Setup. We used the same corpus of queries
and the same database of trips as in the other experi-
ments. For each query, we ran all of the mechanisms
that support the query and recorded the relative error (i.e.
utility) of each one. We defined the oracle utility for each
query to be the minimum error achieved by any of the
four implemented mechanisms for that query. The ora-
cle utility is intended to represent the utility that could
be obtained if a perfect oracle for mechanism selection
were available. We used our syntax-based mechanism
selection method to select a single mechanism, and de-
termined the utility of that mechanism. Finally, we com-
puted the difference between the oracle utility and the
utility achieved by our selected mechanism.
Results. We present the results in Figure 11. For 88%
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Figure 9: Utility of elastic sensitivity and restricted sensitivity, by presence of joins.
Figure 10: Utility of Sample & Aggregate, by aggrega-
tion function.
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Figure 11: Effectiveness of automatic mechanism selec-
tion.
of the queries in our corpus, the automatic mechanism
selection rules select the best mechanism, and therefore
provide the same utility as the oracle utility. Of the re-
maining queries, the selected mechanism often provides
nearly oracle utility: for 7% of queries, the selected
mechanism is within 10% error of the oracle utility.
The remaining queries (5%) represent opportunities
for improving the approach—perhaps through the use
of a prediction model trained on features of the query
and data. Previous work [30, 34] uses such a machine
learning-based approach; for range queries, these results
suggest that a learning-based approach can be very ef-
fective, though the approach has not been evaluated on
other types of queries.
7.5 Discussion and Key Takeaways
Strengths & weaknesses of differential privacy. The
mechanisms we studied generally worked best for statis-
tical queries over large populations. None of the mech-
anisms was able to provide accurate results (e.g. within
1% error) for a significant number of queries over pop-
ulations smaller than 1,000. These results confirm the
existing wisdom that differential privacy is ill-suited for
queries with small sample sizes. For large populations
(e.g. more than 10,000), on the other hand, multiple
mechanisms were able to provide accurate results. In ad-
dition, a large set of such queries exists in our corpus.
Mechanism performance. Our performance evaluation
highlights the variability in computation costs of differ-
ential privacy mechanisms. Approaches such as Elas-
tic Sensitivity or Restricted Sensitivity incur little over-
head, suggesting these mechanisms are ideal for perfor-
mance critical applications such as real-time analytics.
Given their higher performance cost, mechanisms such
as WPINQ and Sample & Aggregate may be most ap-
propriate for specialized applications where performance
is less important than suitability of the mechanism for
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a particular problem domain. For example, WPINQ is
the only evaluated mechanism that supports synthetic
data generation, a task known to be highly computation-
intensive.
The performance of intrinsically private queries can
depend on the database engine and transformations ap-
plied to the query. In this work we do not attempt to
optimize the rewritten queries for performance.
Unsupported queries. The current implementation of
CHORUS applies a single mechanism to an entire input
query. As a result, every aggregation function used by
the input query must be supported by the selected mech-
anism, or the transformation fails. For example, consider
a query with joins that outputs both a count and an aver-
age. Neither Elastic Sensitivity (which does not support
average) nor Sample & Aggregate (which does not sup-
port join) can fully support this query.
This issue disproportionately affects WPINQ, since
our implementation of WPINQ does not support
COUNT(DISTINCT ...) queries. It is not obvious how to do
so: the weights of any record in the database only reflect
the number of duplicate rows until a join is performed
(and weights are re-scaled).
It is possible to leverage multiple mechanisms in a sin-
gle intrinsically private query by treating each output col-
umn separately. This approach would provide improved
support for queries like the example above, which use
several different aggregation functions. We leave such
an extension to future work.
8 Related Work
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy was origi-
nally proposed by Dwork [16, 19, 17]. The reference by
Dwork and Roth [22] provides an overview of the field.
Much recent work has focused on task-specific mech-
anisms for graph analysis [29, 49, 32, 33, 12], range
queries [28, 35, 36, 37, 56, 54, 13, 47, 8, 55], and analy-
sis of data streams [20, 50]. As described in Section 7.5,
such mechanisms are complementary to our approach,
and could be implemented on top of CHORUS to provide
more efficient use of the privacy budget.
Differential Privacy Systems. A number of systems
for enforcing differential privacy have been developed.
PINQ [39] supports a LINQ-based query language, and
implements the Laplace mechanism with a measure of
global sensitivity. Weighted PINQ [46] extends PINQ to
weighted datasets, and implements a specialized mecha-
nism for that setting.
Airavat [48] enforces differential privacy for MapRe-
duce programs using the Laplace mechanism. Fuzz [25,
27] enforces differential privacy for functional programs,
using the Laplace mechanism in an approach similar
to PINQ. DJoin [41] enforces differential privacy for
queries over distributed datasets. Due to the additional
restrictions associated with this setting, DJoin requires
the use of special cryptographic functions during query
execution so is incompatible with existing databases.
GUPT [40] implements the Sample & Aggregate frame-
work for Python programs.
In contrast to our approach, each of these systems sup-
ports only a single mechanism and, with the exception of
Airavat, each implements a custom database engine.
Security & Privacy via Query Rewriting. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the first work on using query
transformations to implement differential privacy mech-
anisms. However, this approach has been used in pre-
vious work to implement access control. Stonebreaker
and Wong [52] presented the first approach. Barker and
Rosenthal [9] extended the approach to role-based ac-
cess control by first constructing a view that encodes
the access control policy, then rewriting input queries to
add WHERE clauses that query the view. Byun and Li [11]
use a similar approach to enforce purpose-based access
control: purposes are attached to data in the database,
then queries are modified to enforce purpose restrictions
drawn from a policy.
9 Conclusion
This paper presents CHORUS, a system with a novel
architecture for enforcing differential privacy for SQL
queries on an unmodified database. CHORUS works by
automatically transforming input queries into intrinsi-
cally private queries. We have described the deployment
of CHORUS at Uber to provide differential privacy, where
it processes more than 10,000 queries per day. We make
CHORUS available as open source [3].
We used CHORUS to perform the first empirical evalu-
ation of various mechanisms on real-world queries and
data. The results demonstrate that our approach sup-
ports 93.9% of statistical queries in our corpus, integrates
with a production DBMS without any modifications, and
scales to hundreds of millions of records.
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